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Proposals to limit anonymous communica-
tions on the Internet would violate free speech
rights long recognized by the Supreme Court.
Anonymous and pseudonymous speech played
a vital role in the founding of this country.
Thomas Paine’s Common Sense was first released
signed, “An Englishman.” Alexander Hamilton,
John Jay, James Madison, Samuel Adams, and
others carried out the debate between
Federalists and Anti-Federalists using pseudo-
nyms. Today, human rights workers in China
and many other countries have reforged the link
between anonymity and free speech.
Given the importance of anonymity as a
component of free speech, the cost of banning
anonymous Internet speech would be enor-
mous. It makes no sense to treat Internet speech
differently from printed leaflets or books.
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Introduction
In a 1997 decision, a federal district court in
Georgia invalidated a state law criminalizing
anonymous and pseudonymous Internet com-
munications.1 In so doing, the court issued a
decision consistent with centuries of American
tradition and jurisprudence. Throughout the
history of this country, pseudonymous and
anonymous authors have made a rich contribu-
tion to political discourse. Had the court held
any other way, it would have fallen into the com-
mon trap of treating the Internet as sui generis,
unrelated to any prior communications media.
Instead, the court correctly recognized that there
is no distinction to be drawn between anony-
mous communications on the “Net” and in a
leaflet or a book.2
Unfortunately, the threats to anonymous
Net discourse have continued to proliferate
since the Georgia decision. U.S. and foreign
law enforcement authorities continue to
regard anonymity as a threat to public order.
Various pending proposals would encourage,
or mandate, changes to the infrastructure of
the Net that would eliminate it as a medium
for anonymous discourse. 
Anonymity and Pseudonymity,
Cornerstones of Free Speech
Controversial and thought-provoking
speech has frequently been issued from
under the cover of anonymity by writers who
feared prosecution or worse if their identities
were known. Cato’s Letters, an influential
series of essays about freedom of speech and
political liberty first appearing in 1720, were
written by two British men, John Trenchard
and Thomas Gordon, under the pseudonym
“Cato.”3 Cato’s Letters had a wide following in
America:4 Benjamin Franklin and numerous
colonial newspapers reprinted the letters;
John Adams and Thomas Jefferson both
quoted Cato.5 “In the history of political lib-
erty as well as of freedom of speech and press,
no 18th-century work exerted more influ-
ence than Cato’s Letters,” historian Leonard
Levy has written.6
In 1735, John Peter Zenger was arrested
for seditious libel for publishing pseudony-
mous essays by Lewis Morris, James
Alexander, and others attacking New York
governor William Cosby.7 Zenger, a German
printer who immigrated to the United States,
also republished several of Cato’s Letters.
Andrew Hamilton of Philadelphia defended
Zenger. In his stirring oration to the jury, he
asked them to lay “a foundation for securing
to ourselves, our posterity, and our neigh-
bors” the right of “exposing and opposing
arbitrary power . . . by speaking and writing
truth.”8 The jury’s acquittal of Zenger helped
to end common law prosecutions of
American writers and publishers under
British common law.
Thomas Paine’s Common Sense, acclaimed
as the work that first sparked Americans to
think of separating from Britain, was first
published signed simply “An Englishman.”9
Perhaps equally famous, Alexander Hamilton,
John Jay, and James Madison wrote The
Federalist Papers under the joint pseudonym
“Publius.”1 0They were answered by the Anti-
Federalists, who wrote under such names as
“A Federal Farmer” (Richard Henry Lee),1 1
“Candidus” (Samuel Adams),1 2 and even
another “Cato” (Gov. George Clinton).1 3
In the following century, as the tensions
between North and South mounted, many writ-
ers on the volatile issue of slavery also shielded
themselves behind pseudonymous identities.14
For example, “A Colored Baltimorean”1 5 wrote
that black people considered themselves
American and desired to live in America in
equality. “Communipaw” wrote about black
economic and social life and about racial preju-
dice among white abolitionists.1 6Women aboli-
tionists writing pseudonymously included
“Magawisca”1 7 and “Zillah,”1 8 who suggested
that abolitionists should confront inequality
within their own movement.
Pseudonymity has continued to play an
important role in political speech in this cen-
tury. George Kennan, a high-ranking member
of the staffs of General George C. Marshall
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and President Harry S Truman and consid-
ered by many to be the architect of America’s
postwar policy of “containment,” signed his
influential 1947 essay, “The Sources of Soviet
Power,” merely as “X.”1 9Politicians, including
presidents, communicate anonymously with
the press when they wish to express ideas or
communicate information without attribu-
tion; press reports are full of quotes attributed
to sources such as “a senior State Department
official” or “a senior White House staff mem-
ber.” Pseudonymity has also protected people
stigmatized by prior political speech or associ-
ation; many blacklisted writers continued to
work throughout the McCarthy era by using
names other than their own.2 0
The Supreme Court on
Anonymous Speech
The Supreme Court has consistently held
that anonymous and pseudonymous speech
is protected by the First Amendment. In its
most recent statement, McIntyre v. Ohio
Campaign Commission,2 1the Court invalidated
an Ohio ordinance requiring the authors of
campaign leaflets to identify themselves.22
The Mrs. McIntyre in the case had been fined
for handing out anonymous leaflets during a
local school board campaign.2 3 The Court
repeated what it had said in Talley:
“Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures
and even books have played an important
role in the progress of mankind.”2 4 It recog-
nized that an author may have a variety of
valid motives for shielding her identity: 
The decision in favor of anonymity
may be motivated by fear of econom-
ic or official retaliation, by concern
about social ostracism, or merely by
a desire to preserve as much of one’s
privacy as possible.25
The Court compared the Ohio ordinance
to the newspaper right-of-reply law it had
invalidated in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo,2 6 noting that the ordinance com-
pelled speakers to add their own names as
part of the content. “[T]he identity of the
speaker is no different from other compo-
nents of the document’s content that the
author is free to include or exclude.”2 7
Anonymity, the Justices pointed out,
“provides a way for a writer who may be per-
sonally unpopular to ensure that readers will
not prejudge her message simply because
they do not like its proponent.”28
The Court astutely placed Mrs. McIntyre’s
leaflet in the context of centuries of anony-
mous political discourse. “Under our
Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is
not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an
honorable tradition of advocacy and of dis-
sent. Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny
of the majority.”2 9 Though the Supreme
Court usually refers only to prior case law
and scholarly legal writings in its holdings, in
this case the Justices took the unusual mea-
sure of citing John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty in
support of the proposition that anonymity is
a protection against the majority’s tyranny.30
McIntyre was not a lightning bolt from the
blue but the culmination of a consistent and
carefully reasoned series of cases dating back
to the 1950s. In its earlier jurisprudence, the
Court repeatedly upheld the right of the
NAACP to keep its membership lists secret
from state prying.31 Later, citing an astonish-
ing record of federal government harassment
and dirty tricks, the Court excused the Ohio
Socialist Workers’ Party from state require-
ments that it disclose its list of contributors.3 2
Moreover, the Court had also previously
invalidated a Los Angeles ordinance against
the distribution of anonymous leaflets.3 3
The parallel between Mrs. McIntyre’s
leaflet and an unsigned Web page or e-mail
on a political topic is obvious. Nevertheless,
people who fail to see the analogy between
the Internet and the print media continue to
call for a ban on anonymity in cyberspace.
The Georgia Law
In 1996, the Georgia legislature passed
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H.B. 1630, an amendment to the state’s
Computer Systems Protection Act, making it
a misdemeanor for one “knowingly to trans-
mit any data through a computer network
[using] any individual name . . . to falsely
identify the person . . . transmitting such
data.”34 Immediately a group of plaintiffs,
including the American Civil Liberties Union
and the author of this paper, brought suit in
federal district court in Georgia challenging
the constitutionality of the law.3 5The district
court granted a preliminary injunction
against enforcement of the law, holding that
“the statute’s prohibition of internet trans-
missions which ‘falsely identify’ the sender
constitutes a presumptively invalid content-
based restriction” under McIntyre.36
The court concluded that the statute
was vague and overbroad because it was
“not drafted with the precision necessary
for laws regulating speech. On its face,
the act prohibits such protected speech
as the use of false identification to avoid
social ostracism, to prevent discrimina-
tion and harassment, and to protect pri-
vacy . . . a prohibition with well-recog-
nized First Amendment problems.”3 7
The preliminary injunction was later con-
verted into a permanent one and the state of
Georgia decided not to take an appeal, so the
district court’s ruling became the final and
definitive statement on H.B. 1630. 
Critiques of Cyberspace
Anonymity
“The ultimate implication, I believe, is
that to achieve a civilized form of cyberspace,
we have to limit the use of anonymous com-
munications,” David Johnson wrote in “The
Unscrupulous Diner’s Dilemma and
Anonymity in Cyberspace.”38 In a Columbia
Law Review note published in October 1996,
Noah Levine called for “a simple statute . . .
requiring administrators of anonymous
remailers to maintain records of users in a
manner which allows for the identification of
senders of specific messages.”3 9 Levine, like
most commentators on this side of the issue,
failed to say why McIntyre would not apply in
cyberspace. 
The Supreme Court said in Reno v. ACLU4 0
that “[t]hrough the use of Web pages, mail
exploders and newsgroups, [any Net user]
can become a pamphleteer.”41 As the Court
recognized, a Web page is an electronic
leaflet. However, if proponents of Internet
anonymity legislation have their way, the
same text may be treated differently depend-
ing on whether it is printed on paper or
stored in electronic form. The proponents
therefore incur a responsibility to explain
why Internet communications are to be treat-
ed differently from print communications.
There are a limited number of legal theo-
ries that advocates of regulation have used to
justify such treatment. The two most impor-
tant ones have already been rejected by the
Supreme Court. Radio and broadcast televi-
sion have been more tightly regulated than
print media on the basis of a theory of “spec-
trum scarcity,”42 and a “pervasiveness” doc-
trine first raised in the Pacifica43 (“seven dirty
words”) case has been used to justify the regu-
lation of speech disseminated by both broad-
cast and cable media. Although no one can
reasonably argue that the Internet is a “scarce”
medium, proponents of Internet censorship
relied very heavily on the argument that the
Net is “pervasive,” meaning that it comes into
the house and may present speech inappro-
priate for minors. This year, in affirming the
unconstitutionality of the Communications
Decency Act,44 the Supreme Court decisively
held that the Internet is not “scarce”: “[T]he
Internet can hardly be considered a ‘scarce’
expressive commodity. It provides relatively
unlimited, low-cost capacity for communica-
tions of all kinds.”4 5 Nor is it a “pervasive”
medium under Pacifica: “[T]he Internet is not
as ‘invasive’ as radio or television.”46
Another argument sometimes raised by
proponents of Internet speech regulation is
even less supported by case law: that margin-
al speech on the Net is more dangerous than
the same speech in print because it reaches
larger audiences more easily. For example, in
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defending the regulation of violent speech on
the Internet, law professor Cass Sunstein
wrote, “Suppose that an incendiary speech,
expressly advocating illegal violence, is not
likely to produce lawlessness in any particu-
lar listener or viewer. But of the millions of
listeners, one, or two, or ten, may well be pro-
voked to act, and perhaps to imminent, ille-
gal violence.”4 7However, the proposition that
controversial speech is acceptable so long as
it reaches only a very few listeners flies direct-
ly in the face of the governing metaphor of
First Amendment jurisprudence, as stated by
Justice Holmes: “The ultimate good desired
is better reached by free trade in ideas. . . . The
best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market.”48 Sunstein, by contrast, argues
that government must intervene whenever
controversial speech is about to gain accep-
tance in the marketplace of ideas.4 9
A closely related argument is that anony-
mous speech is more dangerous on the
Internet because of the lack of gatekeepers—
such as publishers, editors, or television pro-
ducers—who may know the identity of the
anonymous speaker or filter out anonymous
speech. However, that argument is also high-
ly anti-democratic and opposed to free mar-
kets because it presupposes that anonymous
speech is acceptable only if prescreened by an
informed elite. “Such an elitist attitude
should not be part of modern free speech
philosophy,” writes attorney Lee Tien in an
informative article on the applicability of
McIntyre to cyberspace.5 0
No gatekeeper stood between Mrs. McIntyre
and her intended audience. In order to recon-
cile McIntyre with a pro-regulation view based
on the lack of gatekeepers, it is necessary to
drag in Cass Sunstein’s volume argument as
well. According to that view, Mrs. McIntyre’s
actions were permissible because her audi-
ence was very small. Here you have two elitist
arguments for the price of one.
Since the Georgia decision, law enforce-
ment authorities have continued to push for
the elimination of anonymity on the
Internet.5 1 On December 17, 1997, law
enforcement officials from the United States
and seven other industrialized countries
issued a joint statement calling for “informa-
tion and telecommunications systems” to be
“designed to help prevent and detect network
abuse.” According to an article in Communi-
cations Daily, “It would be helpful to law
enforcement if information sent over the
Internet were tagged, and packets would
transmit information reliably as to where
they came from, including user and service
provider, officials said.”5 2
A few months later, FBI director Louis
Freeh testified to a Senate appropriations
subcommittee about child pornography,
encryption, and the traceability of e-mail. His
prepared remarks stated: “The telephone
industry is required by FCC regulation to
maintain subscriber and call information for
a fixed period of time. It would be beneficial
for law enforcement if Internet service
providers adopt a similar approach for
retaining subscriber information and records
for screen names and associated Internet
working protocol numbers, or ‘IP addresses.’ ”5 3
Laws requiring the disclosure of identity in
cyberspace would require far-reaching changes
in Internet technology. Today, one can set up
an Internet account without one’s full name
being stored anywhere on the Internet; in fact,
by setting up accounts on a private network
attached to the Internet, users may gain use of
the Net without placing their identities on file
anywhere at all. Anonymity and pseudonymi-
ty are built into the architecture of the Net.
Legislators should be particularly wary of laws
requiring sweeping changes to communica-
tions technology in order to serve speech-
restricting goals.
Conclusion
Problems linked to anonymity, such as dif-
ficulty in tracing hackers and perpetrators of
online fraud,5 4 must find other solutions.
Better security practices as a preventive mea-
sure are a logical first step.5 5Around the world,
many governments refuse to protect their citi-
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zens’ basic rights, including the right of free
speech. Anonymous Internet communica-
tions may be the only way to ensure those
regimes’ accountability.56 For example, Lance
Cottrell, CEO of anonymizer.com, has recent-
ly joined forces with Professor Lord Alton,
long active in human rights work, to offer
Chinese citizens anonymous access to a site
and survey on Chinese population control.57
Anonymous and pseudonymous speech
on the Internet forms a part of the rich tradi-
tion of such speech in prior media, including
print, and is entitled to the same First
Amendment protections. Legislation against
anonymity threatens to end that rich tradi-
tion and should be opposed. If such legisla-
tion is passed, we can be confident that the
Supreme Court will again find it inconsistent
with our Constitution and our history. 
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